

THE THIRD WAY CULTURE PROGRAM



COME LET US REASON TOGETHER:
A FRESH LOOK AT SHARED CULTURAL VALUES BETWEEN PROGRESSIVES AND EVANGELICALS

A THIRD WAY REPORT

OCTOBER 2007

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	1
Section 1: “In the World But Not of It”	
A Brief History of Evangelical Public Engagement	3
Section 2: “Eyes to See and Ears to Hear”	
Five Reasons Common Ground is Possible	
REASON #1: Contrary to popular stereotypes, Evangelicals are not a monolithic group.....	7
- The One-fifth, One-third, One-half Formula	
- Evangelicals and Voting	
REASON #2: Evangelical views on cultural issues are far more nuanced than most believe.....	9
- Abortion and the Morning-After Pill	
- Gay issues	
- Embryonic Stem Cell Research	
REASON #3: The predominant ways Evangelicals and progressives see government’s role in affecting social change—one changing hearts, the other changing society—need not be in conflict.	11
- The Role of Government	
- The Golden Rule as a Common Framework for Good Government	
REASON #4: Evangelical distrust of progressives is often rooted in the belief that progressives harbor hostility toward religion and religious people, and progressives are beginning to address this stereotype.....	13
- Evangelical Concerns about the Role of Religion in Public Life	
- Perceptions that the Democratic Party is Unfriendly to Religion	
- Progressive Acknowledgement of the Need to Re-engage on Religion	
REASON #5: Evangelicals are going through a time of social and generational change, which presents new opportunities for cooperation.	16
- New Leaders and a Call for Change	
- A New Generation in Transition	
Section 3: “A Time to Heal”	
A Shared Vision for Respecting Religion in the Public Square.....	19
Section 4: “Come Let Us Reason Together”	
A Shared Vision on Five Divisive Cultural Issues	
1. Gay and Lesbian Issues.....	21
2. Abortion.....	22
3. The Treatment of Human Embryos	23
4. Safe Spaces for Our Children Online	24
5. Responsible Fatherhood.....	25
Conclusion: Reasoning Together	27
Sources	29
Appendices	33
Appendix A: Basic Demographic	
Appendix B: The One-Fifth, One-Third, One-Half Formula	
Appendix C: Religious Belief and Practice and the Importance of Faith in Voting	
Appendix D: Voting Trends, Partisanship, and Political Ideology	
Endnotes	41

About the Authors

Rachel Laser is Director of The Third Way Culture Program. Prior to joining Third Way, Ms. Laser was Senior Counsel in the Health and Reproductive Rights group at the National Women's Law Center, where she focused on abortion, family planning and judicial nominations and directed their Pharmacy Refusal Project. Prior to NWLC, Ms. Laser served as General Counsel for Planned Parenthood of Metropolitan Washington and at a DC women's health lobbying firm, where she focused on maternal health issues. Ms. Laser graduated from Harvard University and the University of Chicago Law School, where she was on the staff of the University of Chicago Law Review. Ms. Laser clerked for Federal Judge Peter Messitte of the Southern District of Maryland.

Robert P. Jones, Ph.D. is a religion scholar and consultant for The Third Way Culture Program. He is the author of *Liberalism's Troubled Search for Equality: Religion and Cultural Bias in the Oregon Physician-Assisted Suicide Debates* (University of Notre Dame Press, 2007) and numerous articles on religion and politics. He holds a Ph.D. in Religion from Emory University and an M.Div. from Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary. From 2005-2006, he was the founding Director of the Center for American Values in Public Life at People For the American Way Foundation. He currently serves on the national steering committee for the Religion, Politics, and the State Group of the American Academy of Religion. His forthcoming book, *Progressive AND Religious: The New Face of Religion in American Public Life*, paints a portrait of progressive religion in America through interviews with prominent religious leaders in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism.

Randy Brinson, MD is Founder and Chair of Redeem the Vote. During the 2004 election, Redeem the Vote registered over 78,000 young people, outpacing all other faith-based voter outreach efforts combined. Over the past few years, Dr. Brinson has been widely sought for his counsel and strategic advice in reaching especially younger Evangelicals by both Republican and Democratic strategists. Dr. Brinson is also a licensed lay minister and board certified gastroenterologist. Over the past 10 years, he has served on the state board of the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, Board of Trustees for the University of Mobile, and served as health care advisor for former Republican Governor Fob James of Alabama. He has been involved in Christian music since bringing WAY-FM to his home of Montgomery, Alabama, in 1999.

Joe Battaglia is Founder and President of Renaissance Communications and is highly active in the religious broadcasting and Christian music industries. His company specializes in providing strategic planning and building media platforms for organizations and communicators of the faith and values message. Prior to forming Renaissance Communications in 1992, he was vice president of Communicom Corp. of America, where he worked for over eighteen years, eight as General Manager of WWDJ, the company's flagship station. Mr. Battaglia has served on the board of the Gospel Music Association (GMA), the Eastern Chapter of the National Religious Broadcasters, and fourteen years as the chairman of the National Christian Radio Seminar (NCRS). He's a graduate of Boston University's School of Journalism, and a published author (*A New Suit for Lazarus*, Thomas Nelson).

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the numerous Evangelical and progressive leaders who believed in this project, gave us their time, shared their thoughts about how to find common ground, and charted a course for a way forward together.

Executive Summary

This paper presents a framework for bridging the cultural divide that has existed between many progressives and Evangelicals.¹ Over the last few years, progressives and Evangelicals have engaged in new discussions to find common ground on issues like caring for the poor, eliminating HIV/AIDS in Africa, and more recently, protecting the environment. These groundbreaking dialogues are significant achievements, but they have succeeded largely by agreeing to sidestep so-called “cultural issues.” As a result, many who consider themselves both Evangelical and progressive have held these identities in considerable tension, and those who identify as one or the other still envision themselves on opposite sides of a cultural gulf.

Based on our research and on extensive conversations with many leaders of the Evangelical and progressive movements, however, we now believe it is possible to begin to move beyond this impasse.² Our efforts here are guided by three core commitments. First, we are committed to making progress on concrete issues through creative thinking and a principled dialogue. Second, we are committed to listening with new ears and learning from one another. Finally, this paper is a call for renewed civility on difficult issues. We are convinced that the current political moment, in which many Americans are looking for ways beyond the divisiveness and rancor of recent years, provides an opportunity to build on the important foundation laid by these initial progressive-Evangelical collaborations.

The title of the paper, “Come let us reason together,” reflects these core commitments and comes from a biblical passage (Isaiah 1:18). In the text, these are God’s words, addressed to the Jewish people. God’s call to “reason together” can function as a powerful symbol of people coming together to reconcile their differences through respectful engagement. The verb “reason” here is a legal term that describes the rigorous give and take of legal mediation, where each side lays out its best arguments and looks for fair resolution and ultimately a mended relationship. We believe such engaged reasoning that finds shared values and policies, especially on divisive cultural issues, is a difficult but necessary step for making concrete progress together.

This paper has four sections. Because we are writing primarily for progressives who too often have an impoverished understanding of Evangelicals, we begin with a brief introduction and political history of Evangelicals in America.

The second section identifies the five reasons why we believe it is possible to find common ground between many Evangelicals and many progressives on cultural issues. In short, they are as follows:

- **Reason #1:** Contrary to popular stereotypes, Evangelicals are not a monolithic group.
- **Reason #2:** Evangelical views on cultural issues are far more nuanced than most believe.
- **Reason #3:** The predominant ways Evangelicals and progressives see government's role in affecting social change—one changing hearts, the other changing society—need not be in conflict.
- **Reason #4:** Evangelical distrust of progressives is often rooted in the belief that progressives harbor a hostility toward religion and religious people, and progressives are beginning to address this stereotype.
- **Reason #5:** Evangelicals are going through a time of social and generational change, which presents new opportunities for cooperation.

In the third section, we attempt to begin to bridge the cultural divide. We propose a statement of respect for the role of religion in the public square that we hope will unite many progressive and Evangelical leaders and individuals. This statement is based on three principles: *1) Respect for religious beliefs and religious diversity is vital for a healthy society. 2) Religion plays an appropriate public, not just private, role in American life. 3) All private citizens have a constitutionally protected right to articulate the religious or moral basis of their political views in the public sphere and protecting these expressions does not conflict with a commitment to the non-establishment of religion.*

In the fourth section, we identify a series of initial policy ideas and statements that are grounded in the insights from our analysis in the first section of the paper. We offer ideas for common ground in five areas: affirming the human dignity of gay and lesbian people, reducing the need for abortion, placing responsible moral limits on the treatment of human embryos, creating safe spaces for our children online, and encouraging responsible fatherhood.

We embarked on this project with a belief that a bridge across the gulf on cultural issues was possible. The metaphor of a bridge implies two-way traffic, and this assumption has been at the heart of our approach. We have identified common ground on cultural issues both by finding places where Evangelicals ought to support a progressive agenda and by identifying Evangelical value commitments and priorities that progressives ought to care about and support. The ideas we propose are grounded in core values that are in fact deeply shared by both progressives and Evangelicals.

Section 1: “In the World But Not of It” A Brief History of Evangelical Public Engagement

In light of the high-profile involvement of Evangelicals in the last few national elections, it may seem surprising that Evangelicals have been largely ambivalent about engaging in politics across much of the twentieth century. This ambivalence stems from Evangelicals’ unique history as a group that has been both in and out of power and from a tension in Christian theology, where Christians are understood to be simultaneously “in the world” but “not of it” (John 17:14-15). Evangelicals have sought to be faithful to this teaching amidst not only changing social circumstances but also their own growth and upward mobility in American society.

When Evangelicals have engaged in politics, there are two distinctive identities that have fueled their participation. Evangelicals think both that they are a persecuted minority group *and* that they are part of mainstream society. For example, fully 77% of Evangelicals consider themselves part of mainstream culture, but almost identical numbers believe that they must fight to get their voice heard (76%) and believe the mainstream media attacks their moral and spiritual values (75%) (Greenberg and Berkold 2004). These identities in turn result in two different styles of public engagement: a dominant defensive posture animated by a desire to protect threatened values and a secondary more open posture driven by a desire for broader social reform.

Although they represented a smaller portion of the population than they represent today, Evangelicals played a critical role in the establishment of religious liberty at the founding of the country. The Baptist minister John Leland, for example, played an instrumental role in influencing James Madison to enshrine religious liberty in the first set of amendments to the Constitution. Evangelicals were the beneficiaries of the 18th and 19th century “Great Awakening” revivalist movements, which led to phenomenal Evangelical growth. As a result, by the 19th century, Evangelicalism had become the dominant religious expression in America, and Evangelicals were heavily involved in many of the major social reform movements of the day, such as the abolitionist, child labor, and temperance movements (McLoughlin 1968).

While there has been and continues to be considerable diversity of belief and practice among Evangelicals, several core beliefs are central to the Evangelical tradition that emerged in the twentieth century. The Evangelical tradition “affirms personal salvation through Jesus Christ; calls individuals to conversion, which involves turning from their old selves and being made new creatures in Christ; and regards the Bible as the final authority concerning all matters of faith and practice” (Penning and

Smidt 2002, 18) (See Appendix C for more details on religious belief, practice, and the importance of faith for Evangelicals in voting).

Evangelicals have grown steadily over the last 100 years, but the public influence of this complex movement has been irregular. The 1925 Scopes trial marked a major decline in public influence of Evangelicals because of their anti-modernist stand on evolution. Additionally, Evangelicals were embroiled in internal conflicts between a new growing Pentecostal/charismatic movement on one front and a more prominent rift between uncompromising fundamentalists and a centrist group of Evangelicals who were more open to modernity on the other.³ These forces, combined with a move toward a theological system that emphasized personal evangelism over social reform as the proper task for the church, largely sidelined

Core Evangelical Beliefs:

1. Personal salvation through Jesus Christ.
2. A call to individual conversion.
3. Belief in the Bible as the final authority concerning all matters of faith and practice.

Evangelicals were catalyzed to launch a “defensive offensive” in the 1970s by the sense that their values and social world were being threatened by hostile outside forces.

Evangelicals as a force in American political life for four decades.⁴ As late as 1965, none other than the late Jerry Falwell was admonishing his followers that the proper role of Christians was to spread the gospel rather than to be involved in civil rights reforms and politics (Marsden 1983, 155).

Beginning in the 1970s, however, a variety of social and theological changes caused Evangelicals to rethink their reticence about political involvement. First, Evangelicals were becoming more upwardly mobile and more a part of mainstream society

(Ammerman 1990, 163). Second, many Evangelicals began moving away from a more pessimistic form of eschatology (theological view of the end of the world) that discouraged social action to one that affirmed the value of working to improve social conditions.

But most importantly, Evangelicals were catalyzed to launch what sociologist Nathan Glazer has called a “defensive offensive” in the 1970s by the sense that their values and social world were being threatened by hostile outside forces. The most prominent of these forces were the continuing reverberations from the upheavals of the Civil Rights movement, especially in the South, along with a series of Supreme Court decisions that found a right to abortion and prohibited government-sponsored prayer and religious symbols in public schools.⁵

This sense of embattlement along with considerable upward mobility provided fertile ground for the contemporary Religious Right political movement: Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority; Pat Robertson, Ralph Reed, and the Christian Coalition; James Dobson’s Focus on the Family Action and its affiliated Family Research Council. These

organizations and a myriad of others galvanized evangelical political involvement over the last few decades of the twentieth century.

This renewed political engagement was accompanied by two things: the development of Christian media and increased partisanship. First, Christian media emerged in the last few decades as a full parallel sphere to mainstream media. Evangelicals are much more likely than the general public to consume religious media: a majority read religious books or magazines (56% compared to 38% of the population) and watch or listen to religious broadcasting (55% compared to 32% of the public). Christian media has produced many religious leaders who are powerful and well respected in Evangelical circles but who may be largely unknown to non-Evangelicals. For example, Evangelicals rate leaders like James Dobson and Franklin Graham very favorably (76 and 77 respectively on a scale of 100), while 71% of non-Evangelicals have never heard of these leaders. Interestingly, prominent leaders who are better known to all Americans such as the late Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson are rated relatively coolly by Evangelicals (46 and 55 respectively on a scale of 100) (Greenberg and Berkstol 2004).

Second, the renewed political engagement among Evangelicals also resulted in a stronger alignment with the GOP. As recently as 1988, Evangelicals were split evenly between the two political parties. In the 1980s, partisan divides among Evangelicals were correlated heavily to region, with Evangelicals in the South still tenuously wedded to the Democratic Party and Evangelicals outside the South more connected to the GOP. During the 1990s, Evangelicals, however, were a critical part of what political scientists Merle Black and Earl Black called “the Great White Switch” (Black and Black 2002, 160), when the Republican Party made strong gains among southern Evangelicals. During President George W. Bush’s first term, the GOP made additional gains among all Evangelicals (Kohut and Keeter 2004).⁶

By 2004, 56% of Evangelicals identified with or leaned Republican, with only 27% identifying with or leaning Democrat; the remaining 17% identified as Independent (Green 2004). Partisanship in 2006 was fairly consistent with this picture, although moderately more favorable to the Democrats: 59% of Evangelicals identified with or leaned Republican, 34% identified with or leaned Democrat, and 7% identified as Independent (Pew 2006). It is important to note that the increased political visibility of Evangelicals has not come primarily as a result of growth but as a result of increased partisanship; since 1992, Evangelicals have consistently represented roughly a quarter of the general population (Kohut and Keeter 2004).⁷

While the renewed political engagement of the past few decades has relied primarily on the dominant defensive style, the more open style of public engagement has also become more prominent, especially over the last few years. This insight is important for understanding that Evangelical-progressive alliances can tap a longstanding, albeit secondary, style of Evangelical public engagement.

Section 2: “Eyes to See and Ears to Hear” Five Reasons Common Ground is Possible

Noting the increasing Republican partisanship among Evangelicals, many progressives have simply written off Evangelicals and many political strategists counsel that Evangelical outreach is simply a waste of resources, despite the fact that Evangelicals constitute 26.3% of the general population (Green 2004). A closer look at the current Evangelical community, however, reveals a much more complex portrait. As sociologist Christian Smith noted: “When it comes to politics, the millions of ordinary evangelicals look not like a disciplined, charging army, but something more like a divided and hesitant extended family” (Smith 2000, 128).

A central goal of this paper is to help progressives and Evangelicals move beyond stereotypical views of each other that have hindered trust and collaboration. Progressives often see Evangelicals as a monolithic group that marches in lockstep with right-wing extremists. Evangelicals often see progressives as secular moral relativists who are hostile to religion and people of faith. In this section, we have identified five essential reasons why common ground between progressives and Evangelicals on cultural issues is possible.

REASON #1: Contrary to popular stereotypes, Evangelicals are not a monolithic group.

Besides their demographic diversity, Evangelicals have a diversity of religious belief and practice (see Appendices A and C for more details). John Green of the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life helpfully divides Evangelicals into three religious sub-groups: Traditionalists (48%), Centrists (41%), and Modernists (11%) (Green 2004).

Traditionalists are the most orthodox, attend religious services most frequently, and record the highest rates of biblical literalism. Centrists are more religiously moderate, attend religious services less frequently, and hold less literal views of the Bible. Modernists are less traditionally religious, attend religious services a few times a year, and hold low rates of biblical literalism. Although these subgroup distinctions are based entirely on religious measures, they are highly correlated to political opinion and provide an initial window into the complexities of the relationship between religion and politics among Evangelicals.


The One-fifth, One-third, One-half Formula

Consistent with Green’s analysis above,⁸ we found a consistent pattern across a number of broader measures that we have dubbed “the one-fifth, one-third, one-half formula” (see Appendix B for more details):⁹

- One-fifth of Evangelicals (representing 5% of the general population) are progressive;
- One-third of Evangelicals (representing 8% of the general population) are moderates who share some progressive values; and
- One-half of Evangelicals (representing 13% of the general population) are conservatives who may be partners on particular issues.

These patterns suggest that while Evangelicals are more conservative than the general population, half of Evangelicals (representing 13% of the population) have views that are in sync with or open to progressive ideas. And this one-fifth, one-third, one-half pattern persists even on the *more challenging terrain of cultural issues*.

This pattern can be seen clearly in Pew’s recent “social conservatism index,” a scale constructed from attitudes across five cultural issues: gay marriage, adoption of children by gay couples, abortion, stem cell research, and the morning-after pill.¹⁰ On this scale, 46% of Evangelicals are highly conservative, compared to 28% of all Americans. Thirty-six percent of Evangelicals are moderately conservative, compared to roughly the same number of the general public. Finally, 18% of Evangelicals are low conservative, compared to 38% of the general public (Pew 2006).¹¹



While Evangelicals were the most conservative religious group measured in the Pew survey, they registered more diversity of opinion than conventional wisdom would suggest, especially given that these measures were all social issues on the front lines of the culture wars.

Evangelicals and Voting

Evangelical diversity of views has not translated proportionately into diversity of voting. Evangelicals vote far more conservatively than this profile would indicate. In 2004, Evangelicals voted 78% for President Bush and 74% for congressional Republicans (NEP Exit Poll 2004). Not surprisingly, traditionalist Evangelicals voted for President Bush in overwhelming numbers (88%). But 64% of centrist Evangelicals, who

are open to many progressive ideas, also voted for President Bush in 2004. Even among the most progressive modernist Evangelicals, only 52% voted for Democratic candidates John Kerry and Al Gore over George Bush in both 2004 and 2000 (Green 2004). In 2006, Evangelical support for congressional Republicans flagged but was still strong at 71% (NEP Exit Poll 2006).

Given the size of the Evangelical community, even modest movements in the Evangelical vote are significant; every 4-point movement among Evangelicals translates into a full point in support in the general population (See Appendix D for a full breakdown of recent Evangelical voting trends by religious orientation).

REASON #2: Evangelical views on cultural issues are far more nuanced than most believe.

The media has made much of Evangelicals as “values voters,” but while Evangelicals are decidedly more conservative on divisive cultural issues, they also often hold complex opinions.


Abortion and the Morning-After Pill

Consistent with other surveys, Pew found that Evangelicals lean decidedly pro-life by a margin of 2-1, as compared to the general population, which leans slightly pro-choice. Despite these high rates of opposition to abortion, however, 61% of Evangelicals agree with the public (66%) that the country needs to find some “middle ground” on abortion laws (Pew 2006).

Moreover, Evangelicals include a high number of “Abortion Grays”—people who think that abortion should neither be legal nor illegal all the time. Sixty-nine percent of Evangelicals are abortion grays, compared to 55% of the

general population. Notably, however, 51% of Evangelicals (compared to only 35% of the general population) hold the single position that abortion should be against the law except in the case of rape, incest, or to save the life of the mother. But only 15% hold the view that abortion should never be permitted, compared to 11% of the general public (Pew 2006). In addition, only 29% of Evangelicals who oppose abortion said they would not vote for a candidate who did not share these views if the candidate’s other views were acceptable (Pew News Interest Index Survey 2004).

With regard to emergency contraception, 53% of Evangelicals oppose over-the-counter availability, compared to 41% of the general public. But only 22% of



Evangelicals oppose it strongly (compared to 17% of the general public), and 58% hold views that are not strong one way or the other (Pew 2006).

Gay Issues

Same-sex marriage may have replaced abortion as the most powerful cultural issue for Evangelicals. Evangelicals' views towards homosexuality are rooted in their theological beliefs about the morality of homosexuality. They also correlate with their higher rates of believing that sexual orientation is a choice. Fifty-one percent of Evangelicals think that homosexuality is "just a way that some people prefer to live;" among non-Evangelicals, only 34% think so (Pew 2006).


Pew asked respondents separately about same-sex marriage and civil unions and found additional complexity. On the one hand, only 13% of Evangelicals support same-sex marriage (compared to 35% of the general public) and 79% oppose it (compared to 56% of the general public)—a majority (51% compared to 31% of the general public) are strongly opposed (Pew 2006). Fifty-five percent of Evangelicals (compared to 34% of the general population) said that this issue alone would determine their vote for a candidate (Pew News Interest Index Survey 2004). And thirty percent of Evangelicals (compared to 54% of the general public) support civil unions (Pew 2006).

On the other hand, however, 38% of Evangelicals (compared to 48% of the general public) do not hold strong positions on same-sex marriage, and a majority of both Evangelicals and the general public (51% and 53% respectively) do not hold strong positions on civil unions (Pew 2006). Moreover, the American Values Survey found that approximately 4 in 10 Evangelicals (compared to 6 in 10 in the general public) supported some type of same-sex relationship recognition, with support for civil unions nearly double support for marriage (AVS 2006).¹²

Embryonic Stem Cell Research

In July 2006, Pew found for the first time that more Evangelicals now favor embryonic stem cell research (44%) than oppose it (40%) (Pew 2006). Like the general public, Evangelical views on embryonic stem cell research have become steadily more progressive over the past five years, increasing from 26% support in 2002 to 44% in 2006.

A word of caution, however, is warranted. In Missouri, Evangelicals opposed a ballot measure that protected embryonic stem cell research while banning



human cloning by 72- 28% margin (NEP Exit Poll 2006), and even non-Evangelicals supported it by margins more narrow than national polling would suggest. It is possible that these differences could be explained by the partisanship associated with the issues when they are considered at the ballot box.¹³

REASON #3: The predominant ways Evangelicals and progressives see government’s role in affecting social change—one changing hearts, the other changing society—need not be in conflict.

Evangelicals are not as anti-government as progressives tend to think, but two beliefs are at the heart of the Evangelical worldview that shape how they view the role of government: 1) Individuals are responsible for their own actions and are prone to act in self-interested ways; and 2) social problems can best be solved by creating the right relationships between individuals rather than transforming social institutions (Emerson and Smith 2000, 76). This viewpoint—strong individualism and a wariness of large institutions—powerfully shapes the kinds of solutions Evangelicals find compelling and the ways Evangelicals perceive the appropriate role of government.¹⁴

The Role of Government

In order to understand Evangelical views of government, it is vital to draw a distinction between large government solutions to social problems, which Evangelicals distrust, and government itself, which Evangelicals understand as God-ordained and necessary for ordering a good society. For example, several interviewees cited Romans 13, a New Testament passage that explicitly says that government is ordained by God, along with a second passage from the gospels that has been used to describe the role of government in creating and maintaining America as an exemplary society:

*You are the salt of the earth. . . . You are the light of the world. A city set on a hill cannot be hid. Nor do men light a lamp and put it under a bushel, but on a stand, and it gives light to all in the house (Matthew 5:13-15, RSV).*¹⁵

The Evangelical leaders we interviewed reflected this worldview. They were largely skeptical of large government solutions but did not demonize government itself. Rather, they offered a cautious assessment of what government can do well and a view of an appropriate role for government that partnered with businesses, religious institutions, and families to create a good society.¹⁶ Many interviewees also offered support for the role of government in restraining evil and protecting people from forces bigger than themselves, such as regulating “big business” to protect local communities.

These sentiments about the appropriate role for government were echoed in one of the most thoughtful statements on Evangelical civic engagement, “For the Health of the Nation: An Evangelical Call to Civic Responsibility.” This document was adopted in 2004 (and reaffirmed in 2007) by the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE), the umbrella group representing over 45,000 churches in over 60 denominations stated:

As Christian citizens, we believe it is our calling to help government live up to its divine mandate to render justice (Rom. 13:1-7; I Pet. 2:13-17). From the teachings of the Bible and our experience of salvation, we Christians bring a unique vision to our participation in the political order and a conviction that changed people and transformed communities are possible.... A good government preserves the God-ordained responsibilities of society’s other institutions, such as churches, other faith-centered organizations, schools, families, labor unions, and businesses (NAE 2004, 3).

This statement encapsulates the way in which Evangelicals structure solutions and perceive the appropriate roles of religion and government. First, government has a God-ordained role to render justice and protect citizens from harm. Second, true social change comes when both institutions *and individuals* are transformed; government can do the first directly but the second only indirectly. Third, in order to transform individuals through social change, government should partner with and support the proper roles of other institutions in civil society, including religious institutions.¹⁷ Finding common ground with Evangelicals will require that progressives understand these principles as we look for shared values and build coalitions around public policies.

Drawing on the analysis above, it is clear that in order to find common ground with Evangelicals, progressives must emphasize the following: 1) an argument that government has an appropriate role to play in addressing a given problem, especially if it is the best provider of the structures to get things done; 2) a thoughtful articulation of how this role of government empowers other parts of civil society to function well, such as businesses, religious communities, civic organizations, labor unions, and families; and 3) the role of government in protecting citizens from financial and physical harm.¹⁸ These guidelines do not cut against progressive understandings of government, as the following sections reveal. They may, however, challenge progressives to more carefully articulate an argument for why government is the appropriate institution for addressing the social problem in question.

The Golden Rule as a Common Framework for Good Government

In the course of our research, we became aware of a concept that has the potential to provide a common language and that has an established presence among both progressives and Evangelicals: the Golden Rule—treating others as we would like to be treated—as a guide to good government.

The NAE’s “Evangelical Call to Civic Responsibility” summarizes the basis for Christian civic engagement explicitly in terms of the Golden Rule:

Jesus calls us as his followers to love our neighbors as ourselves. Our goal in civic engagement is to bless our neighbors by making good laws. . . . When Christians do justice, it speaks loudly about God. And it can show those who are not believers how the Christian vision can contribute to the common good and help alleviate the ills of society (NAE 2004, 3).

The American Values Survey also found overwhelming support among Evangelicals and the general public for the idea of the Golden Rule as a guide to good government. More than 8 out of 10 Evangelicals and 89% of the general public said they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who pledged to follow the Golden Rule as a guiding principle in the political context (AVS 2006).¹⁹

Among progressives, former Congressman Ted Strickland ran successfully for governor of Ohio by outlining a progressive platform guided by the idea of the Golden Rule.²⁰ On the campaign trail, he spelled out its meaning as follows:

Being a Golden Rule Democrat means you do your best to treat other people the way you yourself would want to be treated. In a political context, it means working for a government rooted in sound judgment, having a thirst for justice and [being] committed to serving its people (Strickland 2006).

We do not suggest that the idea of the Golden Rule as a guide to good government will eliminate the cultural tensions between progressives and Evangelicals, but tapping this widely held cultural value has the potential to create a common frame—one that unites concerns about changed people and transformed institutions—for new conversations about the role of government.

REASON #4: Evangelical distrust of progressives is often rooted in the belief that progressives harbor hostility toward religion and religious people, and progressives are beginning to address this stereotype.

Evangelicals have strong views about the role of religion in public life and equally strong views that progressives are hostile to religion. Many of these Evangelical perceptions are based on stereotypes and a misunderstanding of progressives and their beliefs, but they are powerful perceptions nonetheless.

Evangelical Concerns About the Role of Religion in Public Life


One of the most prominent themes that emerged from our interviews with Evangelical leaders is that religion is not welcomed in public life. These worries about hostility to religion in the public square were echoed in the NAE’s “Evangelical Call to

Civic Responsibility,” which mentions in its preamble “aggressive” and “radical” secularism as central reasons Evangelicals ought to engage in public policy (NAE 2004, 1). Because Evangelicals emphasize the importance of right “hearts” and right relationships between individuals, Evangelicals see religion as performing a vital social function, one that government cannot fulfill.²¹

While public opinion surveys show that some of these concerns are shared by the general population, they are particularly strong among Evangelicals. Pew found that fully 85% of Evangelicals (and 69% of the country) agree that “liberals have gone too far in trying to keep religion out of the schools and the government” (Pew 2006). Fifty-five percent of Evangelicals (compared to only 36% of the general public) believe that religion is losing influence on government and that this is a problem (Pew 2006).

Perceptions that the Democratic Party is Unfriendly to Religion

Evangelical perceptions that the Democratic Party is unfriendly to religion have increased from one in five (20%) in 2003 to more than one in three (34%) in 2006—a 70% increase (Pew 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006). These trends were also reflected in perceptions of Democratic “friendliness” to religion. By 2006, only 1 out of 4 Americans and 1 out of 5 Evangelicals thought the Democratic Party was friendly to religion (Pew 2003, 2006).



In a nation in which religion holds such an important place for the majority of citizens,²²

these perceptions of Democratic unfriendliness to religion have a substantial impact at the ballot box. Researchers at the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life found that perceptions of Democratic Party friendliness to religion was a strong predictor of vote, exceeding the power of other factors such as frequency of church attendance and gender (Smith and Craighill 2006).

Interestingly, the Republican Party’s image as the religion-friendly party has also slipped significantly among Evangelicals in the past year. As recently as 2005, 63% of Evangelicals and 55% of Americans saw the Republican Party as friendly to religion. In 2006, however, only half of Evangelicals said the Republican Party was friendly to religion; this 13-point drop puts Evangelicals almost even with the general public in their perceptions of Republican friendliness to religion (Pew 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006).

Progressive Acknowledgement of the Need to Re-engage on Religion

Progressives and Democrats clearly have an image problem with much of the country and particularly with Evangelicals regarding religion. Fortunately, progressives are already acknowledging their need to reenter the discussion over the appropriate role of faith and religion in public life. In a speech Sen. Barack Obama gave in June 2006 to the Evangelical group Sojourners on the occasion of receiving the “Joseph Award” for public service to the poor, Obama summarized the ambivalence of progressives in recent years on the subject of religion:

At best, we may try to avoid the conversation about religious values altogether, fearful of offending anyone and claiming that—regardless of our personal beliefs—constitutional principles tie our hands. At worst, some liberals dismiss religion in the public square as inherently irrational or intolerant, insisting on a caricature of religious Americans that paints them as fanatical, or thinking that the very word “Christian” describes one’s political opponents, not people of faith (Obama 2006).

Obama went on to say that if progressives would address some of their discomfort with religion, “we might realize that we have the ability to reach out to the Evangelical community and engage millions of religious Americans in the larger project of America’s renewal” (Obama 2006).

In a recent speech at Baptist-affiliated Eastern University, Democratic National Committee Chair Howard Dean also acknowledged that “a divide has developed in part because [some] people in politics sought that division to get votes. In this climate, [Democrats] failed to articulate our respect for the intersection of faith and religion in public life” (Allison 2007).

Contrary to the stereotypes about progressive hostility to religion, this new movement to re-engage religion among progressives draws on a rich progressive history of authentic religious belief and practice—a tradition that affirmed religious voices in public life while protecting constitutional boundaries between the institutions of religion and government (A Shared Vision 2002). Perhaps the most prominent example of the strong role of religion in the progressive movement is Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., whose work was deeply informed by his religious identity. Moreover, progressive religious organizations—what sociologist Robert Wuthnow called “the quiet hand of God” because of their consistent presence but low profile (Wuthnow 2002)—are stepping out more prominently to claim their place in public debates.

Finally, progressives leaders are beginning to understand and emphasize that, like other Americans, most progressives too are significantly religious. For example, among self-identified Democrats, 9 in 10 (89%) are religiously affiliated (compared

to 87% of the general population), 8 in 10 (79%) believe the Bible is the word of God (compared to 78% of the general population), 55% attend religious services monthly (compared to an identical percent of the general population), and only 13% say religion is not very important to their lives (compared to 15% of the general population). Among self-identified liberals, nearly 8 in 10 (78%) are religiously affiliated, 6 in 10 (59%) believe that the Bible is the word of God, nearly half (45%) attend religious services monthly, and only 3 in 10 (30%) say religion is not very important to their lives (Pew 2006).²³

Progressives clearly have an image problem with much of the country and particularly with Evangelicals regarding religion. However, the recent drop in perceptions of Republicans as the religion-friendly party, the authentic religious roots of many progressives, and new progressive efforts to re-engage on religion present a real opportunity to reach out to Evangelicals and reposition the progressive movement as one that respects an appropriate role for religion in public life and welcomes publicly engaged religious citizens.

REASON #5: Evangelicals are going through a time of social and generational change, which presents new opportunities for cooperation.

Among their leaders and throughout the younger generation, Evangelicals are in the midst of a transition.

New Leaders and a Call for Change

As the spate of recent articles on the occasion of the Rev. Jerry Falwell's death have noted, there is a changing atmosphere within Evangelicalism that is reacting to a conservative movement that has gone too far in its entanglement with partisan politics and that has become too defensive in its posture and too narrowly focused on a few divisive issues. As a recent *Newsweek* story noted, "a new generation of evangelical believers is pressing beyond the religious right of Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, trying to broaden the movement's focus from the familiar wars about sex to include issues of social and economic justice" (Miller 2006). In an interview for the *New York Times*, Brian D. McLaren, founding pastor of the Cedar Ridge Community Church outside of Baltimore and leader of the new "emerging church" movement among Evangelicals, echoed this outlook, saying: "In many, many areas, I'm looking at polarization, and I'm looking at a third way" (Luo 2006).

This new movement is identifying with a broad set of leaders who are less tied to the so-called "Religious Right" and the GOP. These leaders include Rick Warren, pastor of Saddleback Church in Lake Forest, CA, who recently hosted Democratic presidential candidate Sen. Barack Obama; Bill Hybels, who leads the Willow Creek network of churches (11,000 churches in 45 countries); Joel Hunter, senior pastor of Northland

Church and a leading Evangelical voice on climate change, who famously stepped down as president-elect of the Christian Coalition because they would not include broader issues on the agenda; and even Bono, the Irish rock star of U2 fame who has appeared with both Warren and Hybels and has moved many young Evangelicals to join the One Campaign to “make poverty history.”²⁴

This new movement has also enlivened longstanding progressive Evangelical groups such as Tony Campolo’s Evangelical Association for the Promotion of Education (EAPE), Ron Sider’s Evangelicals for Social Action, and Jim Wallis’s Sojourners/Call to Renewal.

Evidence of this new movement can also be seen in two of the largest Evangelical organizations: the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) and among Baptists in the South. Under the leadership of Rich Cizik, for example, the NAE has taken a high-profile stance against poverty, global warming, and most recently, torture. The sixteen million-member Southern Baptist Convention, the largest Protestant denomination in the country, for the first time in over two decades recently elected a president that was not from a core group of more fundamentalist leaders, who is in small but significant ways changing the tone and broadening the agenda within the SBC. With the support and leadership of former presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, both raised as Southern Baptists, more than forty moderate Baptist groups in the South are organizing around a New Baptist Covenant (Suggs and Blake 2007).

This changing landscape has laid the groundwork for finding common ground on the very issues that have been at the heart of the culture wars.

A New Generation in Transition

Beyond the leadership, Evangelicals under 30 are an important constituency to understand for the future of any bridge-building efforts. Paradoxically, younger Evangelicals are simultaneously more partisan and more progressive on many issues than older Evangelicals. On the one hand, they have come of age after the large Evangelical partisan realignment and largely take for granted the strong ties between Evangelicals and the GOP (Penning and Smidt 2002, 135 ff.). On the other hand, because younger Evangelicals did not create but inherited many of the battle lines over cultural issues, they do not own them in the same way as the previous generation; they are less uniformly conservative on cultural issues and are looking to apply their religious beliefs to a broader agenda. In this regard, younger Evangelicals are much more likely than their parents to connect with the more open proactive style of public engagement than the more defensive style; as one of our interviewees put it, “You’ll find very few [cultural] separatists among the younger generation.”

Currently, younger Evangelicals remain much closer to older Evangelicals than to other young Americans in terms of voting and party identification, although the 2006 mid-term elections revealed some significant movement. Beginning in 2004, younger

Americans as a whole began trending more Democratic, preferring John Kerry over George Bush 54% to 46% in 2004 and Democrats over Republicans 60% to 38% in the 2006 house vote (NEP Exit polls 2004, 2006). In contrast, in 2004 a remarkable 84% of younger Evangelicals voted for President Bush; in 2006, however, although young Evangelical support for Republican house candidates remained high, it dropped ten points to 74% (NEP Exit Poll 2006).

Younger Evangelicals have more complex religious identities and hold more progressive positions than older Evangelicals on the role of religion and government. They attend religious services less frequently (48% vs. 67% attending weekly respectively) and are less likely to be biblical literalists (45% vs. 61% respectively). Nearly twice as many younger Evangelicals as older Evangelicals are worried about public officials who are too close to religion (42% vs. 22% of older Evangelicals) (AVS 2006).²⁵ A strong majority (59%) of younger Evangelicals think that the government ought to work to improve the lives of all citizens, while a plurality (45%) of older Evangelicals affirm the opposite sentiment that this is not the government's job and that each person should look out for themselves (AVS 2006).

Younger Evangelicals also have more complex views on many cultural issues, holding more progressive views, for example, on gay and lesbian issues (though equally as conservative on abortion). For example, 6 out of 10 younger Evangelicals support either same-sex marriage or civil unions compared to only 37% of older Evangelicals (AVS 2006).²⁶ On abortion, however, younger Evangelicals are aligned with older Evangelicals, with three-quarters believing that abortion should be made illegal or illegal with a few exceptions (AVS 2006). This complex outlook suggests that they are a generation in transition and an important constituency for progressives to understand.

Section 3: “A Time to Heal”

A Shared Vision for Respecting Religion in the Public Square

Now that we have described who Evangelicals are and why we believe there is room for common ground with progressives, we now turn to the task of finding common ground on so-called “cultural issues.” We begin that quest by outlining some shared principles for the role of religion in the public square—principles that can help provide a more trusting and thus sturdier foundation on which to build common ground on a wide range of cultural issues.

Shared Principles for the Role of Faith in Public Life and Politics

We believe that most Americans want their leaders to respect religion and to acknowledge its importance in American society, while preserving **both** First Amendment principles of religious liberty: non-establishment and free exercise. We also believe that everyone has a responsibility to heal this divide, for in the absence of dialogue, misperceptions and fears rule the day. We have faith that a new conversation might begin to repair some of the broken trust and help create a healthier atmosphere in which to work together to find common ground.

Toward that end, we recommend the following basic principles as a first step in bridging the divide over the role of religion in American public life:

- **Respect for religious beliefs and religious diversity is vital for a healthy society.**

For many, religious beliefs and practices provide a sense of guiding purpose, sustain hope in difficult times, and ground a sense of obligation to others. In addition to their primary religious functions, churches, synagogues, mosques, and other religious organizations fill critical roles such as providing disaster relief, social services, and health care, especially to the least and last among us. One of America’s greatest strengths is its religious vibrancy and diversity. The government can play a healthy role in fostering respect for rights of belief and conscience.

- **Religion plays an appropriate public, not just private, role in American life.**
 - a. We affirm the important role of religion in informing many people’s public interactions and shaping their views on government and policy.
 - b. We affirm the rights of churches, synagogues, mosques, and other religious organizations to engage in public debate. We recognize the central role

religious institutions have played in some of the most important movements for social change in American history, such as the abolitionist and civil rights movements. Religious organizations, along with other organizations in civil society, play important roles in holding government accountable for its actions and keeping our country's moral compass true.

- **All citizens have a constitutionally protected right to articulate the religious or moral basis of their political views in the public sphere, and protecting these expressions does not conflict with a commitment to the non-establishment of religion.**
 - a. In addition to this constitutional right to religious expression, we further affirm that no religious citizen operating in the public sphere should be expected to act as if their faith did not matter to them. The views of religious citizens, like the views of all citizens, should be welcomed and respected. The act of explaining the motivations and foundations of one's political views—whether or not religious—should be understood as a laudable democratic practice that strengthens understanding and civic friendship.
 - b. We also affirm that the constitutional principle of non-establishment of religion is fundamental to the continued health and vitality of both democracy and religion in America. We believe that government and political majorities should not be deciding theological questions or choosing which sacred symbols to promote. We recall that Baptists like Roger Williams, John Leland, and other religious leaders were the original promoters of these principles. These religious leaders feared that government-sponsored religion would be oppressive to religious minorities and bad for religion itself. The success of this American experiment can be seen in its results: we have more religious freedom than in perhaps any other country in the world, and this fertile environment has nurtured the remarkable vitality and diversity of contemporary American religion.

Section 4: “Come Let Us Reason Together” A Shared Vision on Five Divisive Cultural Issues

In this section, we have taken five key cultural areas and identified common ground in order to show that it is possible to have conversations even on some of the toughest issues. Beyond promoting sound policy for the nation, our hope is to help Evangelicals and progressives move beyond mutual distrust on cultural issues to respectful civic partnerships that operate on the assumption of good faith even in the midst of disagreement. This reconfiguration makes a significant contribution to a more civil democratic dialogue and serves as a foundation for progress on the toughest issues.

1. Gay and Lesbian Issues

Progressives’ and Evangelicals’ shared commitment to human dignity, and also the Golden Rule, has hopeful implications for creating a foundation of mutual respect with regard to one of the most difficult cleavages between these two groups—attitudes about public policies that relate to gay and lesbian people.

One of the deepest areas of disagreement between Evangelicals and progressives relates to legal rights for gay and lesbian people. These differences are deep and real, and they are rooted in a variety of interrelated factors, including theological and/or philosophical beliefs about the morality of homosexuality, opinions about whether homosexuality is innate, and the likelihood of having a close friend or family member who is openly gay or lesbian.

In addition to these real differences of belief, opinion, and social experiences, progressive-Evangelical coalitions have been hindered by Evangelical worries that expanding legal rights of gay and lesbian persons would compromise their own religious beliefs and undermine religious liberty. We believe, however, that the forced choice between protecting religious liberty and protecting the human rights and dignity of gay and lesbian people is a false one. We believe that in the midst of real differences, there are shared principles that are rooted in respect for human dignity, and commitments to both the Golden Rule and religious liberty. These shared principles will not resolve the very real differences with respect to many policies, but should provide a shared foundation for more productive discussion.

Human dignity is innate. For Evangelicals and many other religious people, human dignity is grounded ultimately in a belief that all are created in the image of God; for others, it is an innate feature of our shared humanity. For all, human

dignity is not a function of what we do but of who we are: all members of a common human family.

Protecting the human rights and dignity of all, even for those with whom one disagrees, is not only a consistent thing to do; it is a proud American tradition and a high moral and religious calling. America was founded on the principle that all have a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and one of the deepest insights that is common to virtually all faith and moral traditions is that we should want for our brothers and sisters the same protections, public benefits, and opportunities we want for ourselves.

No legislation to protect the human dignity of gay and lesbian people should or need abridge the religious liberty of religious communities. Religious liberties and civil liberties are grounded in the same constitutional principles and must go forward together. Religious groups have a constitutionally protected right to manage their own communities, regulate their own religious practices, and express their beliefs publicly on issues around homosexuality.

2. Abortion

The issue of abortion has arguably been the most divisive cultural issue of our time. Certainly, there are real differences between progressives, who are majority “pro-choice” and Evangelicals, who are majority “pro-life.” Even here, however, there is ample room for common ground and a shared desire from all parts of the nation, including Evangelicals, to find it on this issue.

Progressives and Evangelicals can both agree that given the high number of abortions that occur every year in America, we should join together to reduce the need for abortion throughout the nation. This conversation has already begun around the Ryan-DeLauro “Reducing the Need for Abortion and Supporting Parents Act” currently pending in the U.S. House of Representatives.

For two years now, Third Way has been engaged with pro-life and pro-choice members of Congress to find common ground around the idea of reducing the number of abortions in America through reducing the need for abortions. Pro-life Representative Tim Ryan (D-OH) and pro-choice Representative Rosa DeLauro (D-CT), with the backing of other pro-life and pro-choice members, first introduced the “Reducing the Need for Abortion and Supporting Parents Act” last year, and now have reintroduced the bill in the 110th Congress.

This legislation is the first bill to join together the most effective strategies, regardless of their identification with the pro-choice or pro-life side, to minimize the need for abortions. The legislation finds common ground on reducing the number of abortions in America by both preventing unintended pregnancies and supporting pregnant women who wish to carry their pregnancies to term.

Among its central provisions, Ryan-DeLauro calls for sex education with an abstinence emphasis and medically accurate contraceptive information, better access to contraception for low-income women, after-school programs for kids, and help for parents on communicating their values to their teens. It also expands Medicaid coverage of pregnant women and S-CHIP coverage of children, addresses domestic violence against pregnant women, helps pregnant women and young mothers stay in school, and expands adoption assistance.

This legislation has become a rallying point for pro-life and pro-choice progressives and has already gained support from a number of faith groups, including Evangelical groups such as Redeem the Vote and Sojourners. Both of these groups support this legislation as common ground for Evangelicals and progressives, as the following support statements attest:

[This legislation] finds a common ground approach to protecting life and supporting families. Its strategy for reducing abortions...is effective and serious. These are very worthy goals and deserve the full support of the Christian community and pro-life organizations across the country.

— Randy Brinson, MD
Founder and Chairman, Redeem the Vote

[This legislation] is an important step toward preventing abortion and supporting pregnant women. For too long, too many people have been satisfied with only a contentious debate over simplified positions of "life" and "choice." A better approach is to foster more energy for and commitment to advancing a dialogue that aims for solutions.

— Rev. Jim Wallis
Sojourners/Call to Renewal

3. The Treatment of Human Embryos

As the debates over embryonic stem cell research indicate, the country remains divided over the level of moral status assigned to human embryos. In the past, these honest disagreements have too often obscured the deeper, sincere commitment of both progressives and Evangelicals to ensuring that there are clear moral and legal boundaries in place regarding the treatment of human embryos. We have identified three policy positions where both sides of this debate might meet. For example, progressives and Evangelicals can agree that putting human embryos on the market for sale²⁷ violates a basic respect for human dignity, could lead to exploitation of the poor, and could take a worrisome step down the path toward eugenics.²⁸

Americans have a deep faith in science but also worry, as philosopher Michael Sandel has recently put it, that "we live in a world where science moves faster than moral understanding" (Sandel 2007). For example, roughly two-thirds of Evangelicals

and the general public agree that current scientific advances will help humankind (Pew 2006), but many Americans, and particularly Evangelicals, worry about placing too much “faith in science and its doctrine of progress” (NAE 2004, 8). We believe that the concept of *responsible progress* is an idea that creates common ground in these complex new areas of biomedical ethics. Responsible progress recognizes that some risks are necessary for science to move forward, but it also cautions that we must act responsibly and thoughtfully to ensure that appropriate safeguards accompany scientific research in order to stay true to our deepest moral commitments. Responsible progress also recognizes that there is no genuine progress that does not protect human dignity.

We believe that progressives and Evangelicals could find common ground on three positions concerning the treatment of human embryos:²⁹

The patenting and sale of human embryos. No company or person should be able to own or sell a human embryo as a commercial product to be bought and sold in the market. This policy would also outlaw the creation of “embryo banks” where embryos are created in advance for general use of third-party customers rather than created in the course of providing fertility treatment to a specific person.

Reproductive cloning (the use of somatic cell nuclear transfer for reproduction). The United States should join virtually all other industrialized countries in banning reproductive cloning. Every country that has national legislation on human cloning bans reproductive cloning.³⁰

Inheritable genetic modification (also known as “germline engineering”). The U.S. should also ban germline engineering, changing the genes in gametes or embryos that would be passed on to future generations. This practice would allow children and their descendants to be genetically constructed with various attributes, a process we believe would lead to the objectification of children and come dangerously close to a full-fledged industry in commercial eugenics.

The United States, which some have called the “wild West of reproductive technology” because of its virtually non-existent regulations, should join other industrialized nations in adopting regulations that draw clear moral boundaries regarding the treatment of human embryos. Allowing the market alone to determine how and why human embryos are used is abdicating our moral responsibilities; thoughtful regulation of the treatment of human embryos is the key to responsible progress.

4. Safe Spaces for Our Children Online

We can all agree that our society needs to put moral safeguards in place regarding the new spaces that our children are occupying today.

In our electronic age, with the new possibilities of instantly accessing images and video and initiating relationships over the Internet through social networking sites, it has become a struggle for parents to stay ahead of the wave of inappropriate material and solicitations that their children are exposed to online, on their video iPods, and even on their cell phones. We believe that Evangelicals and progressives can agree that government has an important role to play in establishing regulations that make the Internet safer for our children. We propose three policies that will protect children from exposure to inappropriate material on Internet pornography sites and from sexual predators on social networking sites.

First, we should create a real age verification system to replace the flimsy honor system used by the pornography industry to keep kids from viewing pornographic websites. Second, we should establish an online porn tax for pornographic products sold online and use the proceeds to go after sex crime violators. Finally, we should improve the safety of social networking sites like MySpace, Facebook, and Friendster for our children by requiring sex-offenders to register all email addresses and online aliases and requiring social networking sites to cross-reference their users with this database and block offenders from communicating with minors.³¹

5. Responsible Fatherhood

When it comes to the family, Evangelicals and progressives have notoriously disagreed on such issues as whether non-traditional families should have the same rights and status as traditional families. Both groups can agree, however, that fathers abandoning their family responsibilities is a real problem for the nation, and that increasing fathers' personal responsibility and strengthening families is a net good for the country and an appropriate role for government.

One of the biggest problems in the last few decades has been the dramatic increase in the number of American children growing up without fathers, which has quadrupled from 6 million in 1960 to 24 million today. We know that children without fathers are five times more likely to live in poverty, nine times more likely to drop out of school, and twenty times more likely to end up in prison.³² A healthy relationship between children and their fathers, when possible, is an important asset not only to child development but to society. Government policies should make it easier for fathers to fulfill their responsibilities to their children and harder not to.

We believe this issue also represents common ground for Evangelicals and progressives, and that both groups can agree to the following policies that value fathers and families: providing job training and opportunities to low income dads, expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit, removing the remaining marriage penalties in the tax code, increasing enforcement of child support payments and domestic violence prevention services, and ensuring that children and families, not the state governments, receive every penny of child support.

Another place for synergy is helping incarcerated fathers play a positive role in their children's lives. Each year, over 600,000 men leave prison and attempt to re-adjust to life outside of prison walls. Research shows that inmates with strong family ties adjust more successfully to life after prison than those without a strong family network.³³ Approximately 55% of men in state prisons are fathers,³⁴ leaving a vast number of children fatherless.

Efforts such as the National Fatherhood Initiative's "Inside Out Dad" program are making inroads in helping dads in jail. While inside prison, fathers participate in training workshops and curriculum sessions organized and taught by licensed staff in order to improve these prisoners' life and parenting skills. Incarcerated dads are also encouraged to correspond and communicate with their children. During the reentry process, fathers have access to workshops and program materials at short-stay facilities where many reside before reunifying with their families. States such as Indiana, Iowa, and Washington have already widely adopted the "Inside Out Dad" program in their correctional facilities as a required component of curriculum for relevant inmates going through the reentry process.

Evangelicals and progressives can agree that programs like this one, which improve incarcerated dads' parenting skills and prepare these men to take an active and positive role in their children's' lives upon release, are important steps towards a healthy future for both parent and child.

Conclusion: Reasoning Together

We began this paper with the metaphor of the bridge spanning the cultural divide between Evangelicals and progressives. The co-authors of this paper (a team of progressives and Evangelicals), along with the many others who have issued supportive statements, have already taken the first steps across that bridge. Throughout this process, we have listened to each other, reasoned together, and reached a place of trust and productive dialogue. The result is a set of shared values and concrete policies we stand behind together. Even on the most divisive issues such as the role of religion in the public square, respect for the human dignity of gay and lesbian people, and abortion, we have identified common ground that opens up new space for progress. With one voice, we are calling for a truce in the culture wars and the end of using each other to make political points.

We have been reminded along the way that our current work does not occur in a vacuum. It builds on work already underway between progressives and Evangelicals on a number of issues, such as poverty and the environment, and it draws strength from the considerable number of Americans who are both Evangelical and progressive.

In order for this paper to bear more fruit, both progressives and Evangelicals will need to continue the hard work of reasoning together. We do not conclude that these conversations will be easy or that the paper's proposals in themselves will resolve all the real disagreements and tensions on cultural issues. But we believe that the gap need not be as wide and the mistrust need not run as deep.

Finally, we offer our heartfelt gratitude to the dozens of leaders in the Evangelical and progressive communities who shared their thoughts, hopes, and concerns with us candidly and confidentially. These conversations alone have helped us forge a deeper and more respectful understanding of our commonalities and differences. We are hopeful that this work of reasoning together will begin to heal the wounds of divisiveness and lead to a path of progress for the country.

Sources

- Allison, Cheryl. 2007. 'We can forge common goals,' Dean assures students. *Mainline Times*. April 6.
- Ammerman, Nancy Tatom. 1990. *Baptist Battles: Social Changes and Religious Conflict in the Southern Baptist Convention*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- AVS. 2006. The American Values Survey (AVS). Directed by Robert P. Jones for the Center for American Values in Public Life, People for the American Way Foundation. August 3-21.
- Bales, Kevin, Laurel Fletcher, and Eric Stover. 2004. *Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States*. Free the Slaves and Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley.
- Black, Earl, and Merle Black. 2002. *The Rise of Southern Republicans*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Bresette, Patrick and Marcia Kinsey. 2006. *Mission Possible: How to Talk about Government*. Public Briefing #7. Public Works: The Demos Center for the Public Sector. March.
- Cromartie, Michael. 2001. *Religious Conservatives in American Politics 1980—2000: An Assessment*. Witherspoon Lecture, Family Research Council. April 21.
- Dorrien, Gary. 1998. *The Remaking of Evangelical Theology*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press.
- Emerson, Michael O. and Christian Smith. 2000. *Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race in America*. Oxford University Press.
- Fukuyama, Francis and Franco Furger. 2006. *Beyond Bioethics: A Proposal for Modernizing the Regulation of Human Biotechnologies*. Washington, D.C.: Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. November.
- Gerson, Michael. 2006. "A New Faith-Based Agenda." *Newsweek*. November 13.
- Greeley, Andrew and Michael Hout. 2006. *The Truth about Conservative Christians: What They Think and What They Believe*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Green, John. 2004. *Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics*. Conducted by the Bliss Institute, University of Akron. March-May.
- Greenberg, Anna, and Jennifer Berktold. 2004. *Evangelicals in America Survey*. Conducted by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research for Religion & Ethics Newsweekly. March 16—April 4.
- Hayes, Richard. 2007. *A Majoritarian Proposal for Governing Human Biotechnology*. *Hastings Center Bioethics Forum*. January 3.
- Henry, Carl. 1947. *The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism*. Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans.
- Etzioni, Amitai. 1998. *The New Golden Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society*. New York: Basic Books.
- Keeter, Scott. 2006. *Will Evangelicals Desert the GOP?* Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. May 6.
- Kohut, Andrew, and Scott Keeter. 2004. *Religion and the Presidential Vote*. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. December 6.

- Jones, Robert P. 2006. Evangelicals Before Foley: Moving Away from the GOP, Not Voting on So-called 'Values Issues', analysis of The American Values Survey. People for the American Way Foundation. November 2.
- Jones, Robert P. and Melissa C. Stewart. 2006. The Unintended Consequences of Dixieland Postliberalism. *Crosscurrents* (winter): 506-521.
- Kellstedt, Lyman, John C. Green, James L. Guth, and Corwin E. Schmidt. 1994. Religious Voting Blocks in the 1992 Elections: The Year of the Evangelical? *Sociology of Religion*. Fall.
- Kessler, Jim and Jessica Dillon. 2005. Who is Winning the Abortion Grays: An Analysis of the 1996, 2000, and 2004 Exit Polls. Third Way. August.
- Kuo, David. 2006. *Tempting Faith: An Inside Story of Political Seduction*. Northampton, MA: Free Press.
- Luo, Michael. 2006. Evangelicals Debate the Meaning of 'Evangelical'. *New York Times*. April 16.
- Marsden, George. 1983. Preachers of Paradox: The Religious New Right in Historical Perspective. In Mary Douglas and Steven Tipton, eds. *Religion and America: Spirituality in a Secular Age*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Marsden, George. 2006. *Fundamentalism and American Culture* (Second Edition). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McLoughlin, William. 1968. "The American Evangelicals: 1800-1900." In William McLoughlin, ed. *The American Evangelicals, 1800-1900*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Mead, Walter Russell. 2006. God's Country? *Foreign Affairs*. September/October.
- Miller, Lisa. 2006. "Politics: Evangelicals vs. the Religious Right." *Newsweek*. November 13.
- National Association of Evangelicals (NAE). 2004. "For the Health of the Nations: An Evangelical Call for Civic Responsibility." October 8. http://www.nae.net/images/civic_responsibility2.pdf accessed on March 19, 2007.
- National Election Pool (NEP) Exit Poll 2004.
- National Election Pool (NEP) Exit Poll 2006.
- Obama, Barack. 2006. On Faith and Politics. Speech given to Sojourners conference. June 28.
- Penning, James M. and Corwin E. Smidt. 2002. *Evangelicalism: The Next Generation*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic Press.
- Obasogie, Osagie K. 2007. 'Walmartization' of Embryos. *Boston Globe*. February 1.
- Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. 2003. Religion and Public Life Survey. July.
- Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. 2005. Religion and Public Life Survey. July.
- Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. 2006. Religion and Public Life Survey. July.
- Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. 2004. News Interest Index. August.
- Rawls, John. 1971. *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Sandel, Michael. 2007. *The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in an Age of Genetic Engineering*. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Schaller, Thomas. 2006. *Whistling Past Dixie: How Democrats can Win Without the South* (Simon & Schuster).
- A Shared Vision. 2002. *A Shared Vision: Religious Liberty in the 21st Century*. Washington, DC. Joint statement by The American Jewish Committee, Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, Interfaith Alliance Foundation, National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA, and the Religious Action Center for Reform Judaism.

- Sider, Ronald J. and Diane Knippers, eds. 2005. *Toward an Evangelical Public Policy: Political Strategies for the Health of the Nation*. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books.
- Smith, Christian. 2000. *Christian America? What Evangelicals Really Want*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Smith, Gregory A. and Peyton M. Craighill. 2006. Do the Democrats Have a 'God Problem'? How Public Perceptions May Spell Trouble for the Party. The Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. <http://pewforum.org/docs/print.php?docid=148>. Accessed on January 11, 2007.
- Smith, Gregory A., Scott Keeter, and John Green. 2006. Religious Groups React to the 2006 Election. Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life. November 27.
- Stein, Rob. 2007. 'Embryo Bank' Stirs Ethics Fears. Washington Post. January 6.
- Stoddard, Ed. 2007. Slavery Campaign Closes Gaps among U.S. Evangelicals. Reuters. April 2.
- Strickland, Gov. Ted. 2006. Of Church and Mom: Confessions of a Golden Rule Democrat. <http://faithfuldemocrats.com/content/view/59/106/>. August 22. Accessed on April 5, 2007.
- Suggs, Ernie and John Blake. 2007. Carter, Clinton Woo Baptists to New Convention. *Atlanta Journal-Constitution*. January 10.
- Sullivan, Amy. 2006. When Would Jesus Bolt? *Washington Monthly*. April.
- Swidler, Ann. 1986. Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies. *American Sociological Review*. 51: 273-86.
- United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. 1986. *Economic Justice for All: A Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy*. USCCB Publishing.
- Walzer, Michael. 1984. *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*. New York: Basic Books.
- Wuthnow, Robert. 2002. *The Quiet Hand of God: Faith-based Activism and the Public Role of Mainline Protestantism*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Appendix A: Basic Demographic

Evangelicals have a distinctive demographic profile in a number of areas. More than half (52%) of Evangelicals live in the South, and Evangelicals are proportionally represented in the Midwest (23%). Evangelicals are underrepresented in the West (14%) and especially in the Northeast (10%) (Pew 2006). Evangelicals are more likely to live in small towns (31% vs. 22% of general public) and rural areas (25% vs. 18% of the general public); only about one in ten (9%) Evangelicals live in large cities, compared to one in five of Americans in general (Greenberg and Berkthold 2004).

Evangelicals are significantly less likely to have a college degree and tend to have lower incomes than the general public. Only one in five (19%) have completed college, compared to 27% of the general public. These lower education levels are correlated to income. Almost a third (32%) of Evangelicals have household incomes under \$30k compared to 27% of the general public. While Evangelicals are slightly more likely to be in the middle class (39% have household incomes between \$30k and \$75k, compared to 35% of the general public), only 17% have household incomes over \$75k, compared to a quarter of the general public (Pew 2006).

Basic Demographics			
	Evangelicals	Non-Evangelicals	General Population
Region:			
<i>Deep South</i>	26	12	15
<i>Peripheral South</i>	26	19	21
<i>Midwest</i>	23	23	23
<i>West</i>	14	24	22
<i>Northeast</i>	10	22	19
Female	57	50	52
Male	43	50	48
Age:			
<i>18-29</i>	11	23	20
<i>30-44</i>	24	29	28
<i>45-59</i>	33	26	28
<i>Over 60</i>	32	22	24
College Degree:	19	29	27
<i>4-year</i>	15	17	17
<i>Post-grad</i>	5	12	10
Income			
<i>Under \$30k</i>	32	26	27
<i>\$30k—\$75k</i>	39	34	35
<i>Over \$75k</i>	17	27	25
Family Status:			
<i>Married</i>	62	53	55
<i>Never Married</i>	10	24	20
<i>Divorced</i>	12	12	13
<i>Parent</i>	31	37	35
<i>Source:</i> 2006 Religion and Public Life Survey, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life.			

More Evangelicals are female (57% vs. 50% of non-Evangelicals), and Evangelicals are significantly older than the population as a whole. Almost two-thirds (65%) of Evangelicals are over 45, compared to 52% of the general public. At the other end of the spectrum, only 11% of Evangelicals are under 30 years of age, compared to 20% of the general public (Pew 2006).

Finally, Evangelicals are more likely than the general public to be married (62% vs. 55%). The proportion of divorced Evangelicals (12%), however, is virtually the same as the general public. Because they are older than the general population, Evangelicals are also slightly less likely to be the parent of a child under 18 (31% vs. 35% of the general public) (Pew 2006).

Appendix B: The One-Fifth, One-Third, One-Half Formula

Roughly half of Evangelicals are not doctrinaire conservatives. A one-half, one-third, one-fifth pattern was roughly persistent across a wide range of measures, including religious orientation, self-identified ideology, the Pew social conservatism index, and party identification. The following table summarizes these measures.

The consistent measures across these different spheres are a good indication of a reliable set of orientations underlying these measures. While no single measure can provide a completely reliable measure of progressive allies and dialogue partners (e.g., not all Evangelical Democrats are progressive allies and not all Evangelical Republicans are non-progressive), the convergence of these measures gives us some

The One-Fifth, One-Third, One-Half Formula Potential Evangelical Coalition Partners			
	Non-Progressives	Moderates	Progressives
Religious Orientation	48% (Traditionalist)	41% (Centrist)	11% (Modernist)
Self-identified Ideology	50% (Conservative)	35% (Moderate)	12% (Liberal)
Conservatism Index	46% (High)	36% (Moderate)	18% (Low)
Party Identification	46% (Republican)	30% (Ind.)	24% (Democrat)
Average	49%	36%	16%
% of Population	12%	9%	4%
<i>Sources:</i> Religious orientation, Green et al., 2004. All others, Pew RPL Survey, 2006.			

confidence in the basic divisions. According to these measures, approximately half of all Evangelicals (representing 13% of the population) are highly conservative non-progressives. On the other hand, slightly more than one-third of Evangelicals are moderates who are potential partners in progressive-Evangelical coalitions. Finally, a little less than one-fifth of Evangelicals are progressive allies. Together, the potential partners and allies make up about half of Evangelicals and represent approximately 13% of the population.

A comparison of self-identification measures of political ideology with the Pew social conservatism index is instructive for why the numbers of Evangelical progressives are often underestimated. The numbers of self-identified conservatives and moderates conform to the one-fifth, one-third, one-half model. Approximately half of Evangelicals both self-identified as Conservative (50%) and scored high conservative (46%) on the index. Slightly more than one-third of Evangelicals both self-identified as Moderate (35%) and scored moderately conservative (36%) on the

index. Note, however, that while only 12% of Evangelicals described their political views as liberal, 18% were classified in the least conservative category on the social conservatism index (Pew 2006). This discrepancy is almost certainly due to the antipathy toward theological liberalism among Evangelicals. It is more likely that the higher figure of 18% for progressive Evangelicals in the social conservatism index is the more accurate figure, yielding approximately one-fifth of Evangelicals that are socially progressive, which then conforms to our model.³⁵

Appendix C: Religious Belief and Practice and the Importance of Faith in Voting

Religious Belief and Practice


In one of the most thorough recent public opinion surveys of Evangelicals, Anna Greenberg and Jennifer Berktold found that Evangelicals stand out from the rest of the country in their strong religious beliefs and practice, and in their desire to incorporate religion informally throughout their lives (Greenberg and Berktold 2004). For example, two-thirds (66%) of Evangelicals believe that the Bible is the literal word of God, compared to only 38% of the population; even a majority of Evangelicals with a 4-year college degree hold this view (57% versus 25% of population with college degrees). Evangelicals are also nearly twice as likely as Americans in general to attend religious services more than once a week (35% compared to 18% respectively). Evangelicals attend informal prayer groups at nearly double the rate of the population (38% versus 21% respectively) (Greenberg and Berktold 2004). A majority of Evangelicals do not attend mega-churches, despite popular belief; only 13% attend congregations with more than one thousand members, and these are concentrated in urban areas (Greenberg and Berktold 2004).

Diversity of Religious Orientations

As noted in the body of the paper, John Green found three religious subgroups. Using measures of religious belief (e.g., about the Bible and God), practice (e.g., religious attendance and prayer), and salience (i.e., the importance of religion), Green identified Traditionalists, Centrists, and Modernists.

Green found that almost half of Evangelicals are Traditionalists. They represent 12.6% of the general population and are the most orthodox, attending religious services most frequently and recording the highest rates of biblical literalism. Four in ten

Evangelicals are Centrists (representing 10.8% of the population) who are more religiously moderate, attending religious services less frequently and holding less literal views of the Bible. About 1 in 10 Evangelicals are Modernists (representing about 3% of the population) who are less traditionally religious, attending religious



services a few times a year and holding low rates of biblical literalism. Although these subgroup distinctions are based entirely on religious measures, they are highly correlated to political opinion and provide a critical window into the complexities of the relationship between religion and politics among Evangelicals.

The Importance of Faith in Voting

Several of our Evangelical interviewees emphasized the importance of faith as a “primary grid” or “filter” through which lifestyle, moral, and political choices are made, and this distinctive trait can be seen in findings on the importance of faith to Evangelicals in voting. A majority (53%) of Americans and strong majority (71%) of Evangelicals say their faith is more or as important to their vote as other factors. There is considerable diversity, however, among Evangelical subgroups. Traditionalist Evangelicals are responsible for the lion’s share of this distinctiveness, with fully 87% saying their faith is more or as important as other factors. Centrist and Modernist Evangelicals are more in line with the public, with 56% of Centrists and only 41% of Modernists attaching this same level of importance to faith (Green 2004). This more complex portrait reveals that about half of Evangelicals weigh their faith more heavily in voting than other Americans, with the remainder of Evangelicals engaging their faith on public matters in a way that is roughly consistent with the general population.

Appendix D: Voting Trends, Partisanship, and Political Ideology

Voting Trends

Green’s subgroup divisions of Traditionalists, Centrists, and Modernists illustrate the diversity among Evangelicals that is hidden in the top line numbers. Traditionalist Evangelicals voted for President Bush in overwhelming numbers (88%). Slightly less than two-thirds of Centrist

Evangelical Voting Trends						
	2006		2004		2000*	
	Rep.	Dem.	Bush	Kerry	Bush	Gore
All Evangelicals (26.3%)	71	26	78	22	74	26
* <i>Traditionalists</i> (12.6%)	N/A	N/A	88	12	84	16
* <i>Centrists</i> (10.8%)	N/A	N/A	64	36	61	33
* <i>Modernists</i> (2.9%)	N/A	N/A	48	52	48	52
Total Population	47	53	51	49	50	50
*Sources: All 2000 data and traditionalist/centrist/modernist breakdowns in all years compiled from John Green, "Fourth National Survey of Religion and Politics," 2004, 2000. All other data compiled from 2006 and 2004 NEP exit polls.						

Evangelicals voted for President Bush in 2004. In contrast, a majority (52%) of Modernist Evangelicals voted for Kerry and Gore over Bush in both 2004 and 2000.

The Importance of Evangelicals to the Democratic Vote

Based on their diversity of political identity, their sheer size (26% of the public and 22% of the electorate in 2004 and 2006) and high turnout rates, Evangelicals actually make up a critical part of the Democratic base even today. One dramatic illustration of the importance of Evangelicals to Democratic candidates is that in both 2004 and 2006, Democratic candidates actually received slightly more votes from white Evangelicals than from Black Protestants, a core constituency in the Democratic Party base. In 2004, 14% of John Kerry’s votes came from Evangelicals, compared to 13% from Black Protestants (Green 2004). In 2006, 11.3% of Democratic House Candidate votes came from Evangelicals, compared to 11% from Black Protestants (NEP Exit Poll, 2006). Democrats have rightly understood the importance of Black Protestants to electoral success; our analysis indicates the often-overlooked but important role that Evangelicals play as well.

Political Partisanship

As with several other key political measures, Traditionalists stand apart from other Evangelicals. Fully seven out of ten Traditionalists lean Republican, compared to fewer than half (47%) of Centrists and less than one-third (30%) of Modernists. Modernists are the only subgroup with a Democratic plurality, but 31% of Centrists lean Democratic with another 22% identifying as non-leaning Independents.

Self-Identified Partisanship By Religious Subgroup			
	Republican	Democrat	Independent
All Evangelicals	56	27	17
<i>Traditionalists</i>	70	20	10
<i>Centrists</i>	47	31	22
<i>Modernists</i>	30	44	26
Total Population	38	42	20

Source: Green et al. 2004.
Note: Partisan "leaners" included with parties; minor party affiliation included with Independents.

Political Ideology

Half of Evangelicals say they are politically conservative, a significantly higher rate than the one-third of the general public who identify as conservative. Just over one-third of Evangelicals describe their political views as moderate. Finally, 12% of Evangelicals say their political views are liberal or very liberal, half the rate of Non-Evangelicals (Pew 2006).

Self-Identified Political Ideology By Religious Subgroup			
	Evangelicals	Non-Evangelicals	Total
Very Conservative	10	4	5
Conservative	40	25	28
Moderate	35	42	40
Liberal	8	18	15
Very Liberal	4	7	6
<i>Total</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>

Source: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2006.

Endnotes

¹ Evangelicals are a complex group and defy easy categorization. In its broadest usage, the term “Evangelical” describes not only a subgroup of white Protestants but also a myriad of African American, Latino, and other Protestants who stem from a common trunk of the Protestant Christian family tree. Our focus in this paper is on white Evangelicals, a group that has a unique history and political behavior and that has presented the largest challenges to progressive coalitions. All data in this paper relies on the standard definition of Evangelicals used in public opinion polling as white Protestant Christians who say they are “born again.” This definition casts the net wide enough to include the major denominational families within white Evangelicalism and has the advantage of being widely used as a standard measure on public opinion surveys. Approximately a quarter of Americans fit this definition of Evangelicals.

² In addition to the co-authors on this paper, we have a number of supportive statements from Evangelical and progressive groups and leaders. Because of the scope of this paper, we did not ask supporters to affirm every policy idea but the approach and spirit of the effort, along with specific policies where they wanted.

³ Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism are closely related but importantly distinct. Noted church historian George Marsden famously summarized the difference by saying that a fundamentalist is “an evangelical who is mad about something” (Marsden 2006). While this is obviously a broad stroke, it gets to an underlying reality of fundamentalism as a lasting protest movement and is often used by Evangelicals themselves. For example, Dr. Frank S. Page, the first non-fundamentalist president of the Southern Baptist Convention in three decades, characterizes himself as follows: “I have also described myself as an irenic conservative. In a more jovial fashion, I have described myself as a person who believes the Bible, but is not mad or angry about it.” (<http://www.sbc.net/PresidentsPage/FrankPage/default.asp>, visited on 1/24/2007). Historically and more analytically, fundamentalism is best understood as a staunchly anti-modernist movement within conservative Protestantism beginning in the 1920s that emphasized biblical literalism, doctrinal purity, otherworldliness, and separation from the world (Penning and Smidt 2002, 16). The contemporary Evangelical movement (symbolized concretely by the formation in the 1940s of the National Association of Evangelicals) differentiated itself by opposing “the more separatist, defensive, and anti-intellectual tendencies of the fundamentalist movement” (Smith 2000).

⁴ There were certainly important exceptions to this trend. One important exception was the influence of Carl Henry, key player in the founding of the National Association of Evangelicals, founding editor of *Christianity Today*, and author of *The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism* (Henry 1947), which criticized the rigidity and disengagement of fundamentalism and called for more proactive social engagement among Evangelicals.

⁵ Michael Cromartie, Vice President of the Ethics and Public Policy Center and Director of its Evangelical Studies Project, summarized this critical turning point in a lecture to the Family Research Council as follows: “What stirred religious conservatives most was a sense that Supreme Court decisions were giving power to the opponents of traditional Christian values. The Court banned state sponsored prayer and Bible reading in the schools (*Engel v. Vitale*, 1962), legalized abortion (*Roe v. Wade*, 1973), and allowed for more government regulation in private Christian schools (*Lemon v. Kurtzman*, 1971)” (Cromartie 2001).

⁶ Black and Black identify the main source of “the Great White Switch” as a backlash against civil rights legislation. After the passage of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, despite the fact that no Deep South Democrat supported it, more whites have voted Republican than Democratic in every presidential election; by the time of Reagan’s presidency in 1984, more southern whites began to think of themselves as Republicans than Democrats (Black and Black 2001, 160, 205). See also “The Unintended

Consequences of Dixieland Postliberalism” for a more thorough analysis of the influence of federal interventionism on Evangelical theology (Jones and Stewart 2006).

⁷ In 1992, Evangelicals represented 24% of the population (Kohut and Keeter 2004), and in 2004 they represented 26% of the population (Green 2004).

⁸ Note that despite the fact that Green’s subgroups were constructed with religious rather than political measures, they cohere fairly well to the one-fifth, one-third, one-half model with the caveat that religious measures alone produce more moderates and fewer progressives. This outcome is not surprising for a group that has defined itself by adherence to traditional religious belief and practice. See Appendix B for direct comparisons.

⁹ Because these figures are rounded approximations, they do not total 100%. See Appendix B for detailed calculations.

¹⁰ Pew sorted the sample into three groups based on the number of conservative answers on these questions. Respondents with zero or one conservative answers were categorized as “low”; respondents with two or three conservative answers as “moderate”; and respondents with four or five conservative answers as “high.”

¹¹ It is worth noting that 1 in 14 (7%) Evangelicals had zero conservative opinions on these social issues (Pew 2006).

¹² Because Pew’s questions were asked separately on different split forms of their survey, the answers cannot be aggregated. The American Values Survey, however, found employed a single question: support for same-sex marriage (28% general public, 14% Evangelicals); support for civil unions (32% general public, 27% Evangelicals); support for no legal recognition (36% general public, 56% Evangelicals) (AVS 2006). The American Values Survey was conducted by the Center for American Values in Public Life at People for the American Way Foundation.

¹³ Almost three-quarters of Evangelicals supported Republican candidate Jim Talent, who opposed embryonic stem cell research, and a little more than three-quarters of Talent’s general supporters opposed the measure (NEP Exit Poll 2006).

¹⁴ Writing in the context of foreign policy, Walter Russell Mead recently arrived at a similar description of the way in which Evangelicals’ worldview shapes and restricts available solutions to policy problems: “Generally speaking, evangelicals are quick to support efforts to address specific problems, but they are skeptical about grand designs and large-scale development efforts. Evangelicals will often react strongly to particular instances of human suffering or injustice, but they are more interested in problem solving than in institution building” (Mead 2006).

¹⁵ This passage has a long history in American civil religion, stemming from John Winthrop’s famous description of America’s divine place in human history “a city set on a hill.” It was also a defining idea for President Reagan. Just a few years before his run for the presidency, for example, Reagan was the speaker at the first annual Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) in 1974, and the title of his speech was “City Upon a Hill.” For the full text of the speech, see http://www.presidentreagan.info/speeches/city_upon_a_hill.cfm, accessed 1/25/07.

¹⁶ While these sentiments are pronounced among Evangelicals, they are also shared by many Americans; a recent survey by Public Works found that a majority (55%) of Americans think that “government is doing too many things that ought to be left to individuals and businesses” (Bresette and Kinsey 2006).

¹⁷ In this last point, Evangelicals have learned from the Roman Catholic “Principle of Subsidiarity,” which states basically that government should undertake only those functions that exceed the capacity of individuals and other institutions in civil society. It has also been interpreted to mean that government should provide the positive conditions necessary for individuals to flourish. The Catholic Bishop’s statement, *Economic Justice for All* is one of the most recent expressions of this principle (USCCB 1986).

¹⁸ These recommendations were derived primarily from Christian Smith’s work (Smith 2000) and our own interviews with Evangelical leaders. They are also informed by Public Works research, which identified three positive models for talking about government: 1) the protection frame, which describes government as the entity that protects citizens from harm; 2) the common good frame, which describes the symbiotic relationship between public institutions and citizens; and 3) the simplifying model, which describes government as the organizational and physical public structures the country needs to get basic things done (Bresette and Kinsey 2006).

¹⁹ The AVS offered the following conceptualization of the Golden Rule: “I believe in the Golden Rule: that we should treat others the way we ourselves would like to be treated. If we followed this simple principle, government would be there for people in need and work equally for everyone, not just the privileged few” (AVS 2006). The “common good” is also a formula that conveys many of these values, but “the Golden Rule” tested slightly better than “the common good” among the general public and significantly better among evangelicals and religious traditionalists.

²⁰ The 2006 exit polls also demonstrate the effectiveness of Strickland’s “Golden Rule Democrat” message among religious voters in Ohio. Although there is no direct measure of Evangelicals on the 2006 Ohio exit polls, Strickland garnered 49% of the weekly church attenders. This achievement represents a strong 14-point increase over Sen. John Kerry’s dismal showing among weekly Ohio church attenders in 2004 (NEP Exit Poll 2006, 2004).

²¹ President Bush captured this sentiment in an address touting his Faith-based Initiative to the National Urban League in 2004: “My community and faith-based initiative recognizes the true strength of this country is in the hearts and souls of our citizens; that we recognize that oftentimes there’s—a change of heart will change behavior, and governments can’t change hearts” (Bush 2004).

²² Only 10% of Americans can be classified as secular. Pew also found that a plurality (39%) of the public believes there should be more expressions of faith and prayer by political leaders (Pew 2005).

²³ Notably as many Democrats (39%) as Republicans (40%) are Biblical literalists, and both exceed the rates of Biblical literalism in the general population (35%). Although strong majorities of liberals believe that the Bible is the word of God rather than simply being a book written by humans, fewer are Biblical literalists (21%) (Pew 2006).

²⁴ Michael Gerson, former speechwriter and policy advisor to President Bush, recently noted that when he asks young Evangelicals on campuses “from Wheaton to Harvard” who they view as the best model of Christian activism, they nearly unanimously cite Bono (Gerson 2006).

²⁵ The results on Evangelical youth from the American Values Survey should be read with some caution due to small sample size. The American Values Survey included a total of 625 white Evangelicals, with 104 under thirty (AVS 2006).

²⁶ As noted above, AVS asked about same-sex marriage and civil unions on the same question, which allows them to be aggregated.

²⁷ Establishing such regulations now is important because we have already seen the beginnings of a new branch of business in selling human embryos in the very lucrative, rapidly growing fertility industry in America. For example, Jennalee Ryan founded “The Abraham Center of Life LLC” in San

Antonio, TX, in 2006 and advertised her service as “the world’s first embryo bank.” The Texas company sold ready-made batches of embryos that women and infertile couples could buy after reviewing detailed information about education, race, physical appearance, and personality. To create the embryos, Ryan contracted with egg donors in their 20s with at least some college education and contracted only with sperm donors who had advanced degrees such as a Ph.D. or a law degree (Stein 2007). Although this aspect of Ryan’s business is apparently defunct as of June 2007, the fact that it was permitted to come into existence reveals the need for the proposed policy above.

²⁸ The influential political philosopher Michael Walzer refers to transactions we disallow for moral reasons “blocked exchanges;” he includes the sale of human beings and procreation rights in his initial list of blocked exchanges (Walzer 1984).

²⁹ These recommendations largely follow recommendations by Francis Fukuyama and Franco Furger in “Beyond Bioethics: A Proposal for Modernizing the Regulation of Human Biotechnologies” (Fukuyama and Furger 2006).

³⁰ Though none have been signed into law, numerous bills have been introduced in the U.S. Congress in recent years attempting to ban reproductive cloning. While the bills differ as to whether they would ban or allow for research cloning (or “somatic cell nuclear transfer”), they have in common a ban on all reproductive cloning. See, for example, the “Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act of 2007,” sponsored by Senator Hatch with Senators Feinstein, Harkin, Kennedy, Rockefeller, and Specter, which would ban reproductive cloning while allowing for research cloning, and the “Human Cloning Prohibition Act of 2007,” sponsored by Senator Brownback with 27 cosponsors, which would prohibit both reproductive and research cloning.

³¹ These provisions are modeled on two bills: one sponsored by Senator Blanche Lincoln (D-AR) and Senator Jim Matheson (D-UT) and the other by Senator Charles Schumer.

³² Many provisions of this proposal are adapted from “The Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Families Act,” co-sponsored by Senator Evan Bayh (D-IN) and Senator Barack Obama. This data is adapted from the online description of the bill (http://obama.senate.gov/press/060629-Bayh_Obama_introduce_bill_to_confront_growing_epidemic_of_absentee_fathers/index.html, accessed on April 8, 2007).

³³ See, for example, “Coming Home: From Prison to the Community with the Help of Faith.” The Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2005. <http://www.aecf.org/upload/PublicationFiles/FF3622H345.pdf>; Christy Visher, Nancy La Vigne, and Jill Farrell, “Illinois Prisoners’ Reflections on Returning Home.” The Urban Institute, Washington, DC, 2003. <http://www.urban.org/publications/311115.html>.

³⁴ See Vicki Turetsky, “Realistic Child Support Policies that Support Successful Re-entry.” The Center for Law and Social Policy, January 2007. <http://www.clasp.org/publications/realisticchildsupportreentrypolicies3.pdf>.

³⁵ Self-identification labels are often difficult to assess. For example, when offered an alternative to the traditional labels of conservative/moderate/liberal, 39% of Evangelicals (56% of Modernists, 38% of Centrists, and 34% of Traditionalists) identified themselves as politically “progressive,” compared to 47% of the public (AVS 2006).



2000 L Street NW, Suite 702
Washington, DC 20036-4915

contact@third-way.com

202.775.3768
202.775.0430 fax

www.third-way.com